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2026 A Contracting Oddity: Movie Studio’s Claim Against NASA Flops at the COFC

Big Easy Studios claimed it had an implied-in-fact ten-year lease with the government to film movies at a NASA facility. The Court of Federal Claims rejected the argument. The court ruled that the contracting officer lacked authority to bind NASA to long-term leases, and the parties executed only express, short-term agreements. The court granted summary judgment for the government on all claims except breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Big Easy Studios, LLC v. United States, Court of Federal Claims, No. 17-879

• Background - NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility in Louisiana leased space to Big Easy Studios for movie production under three short-term Space Act Agreements from 2011 to 2017. Big Easy claimed that the NASA contracting officer promised a ten-year Enhanced Use Lease and that Big Easy spent over $2.4 million improving the facility in reliance on that promise. When NASA refused to execute a long-term lease and terminated the final short-term agreement in 2017, Big Easy sued for breach of contract, alleging express and implied-in-fact contracts, quantum meruit, and equitable estoppel. The government moved for partial summary judgment.

• Contracting Officer Authority - Big Easy argued that the contracting officer had authority to bind NASA to a long-term lease based on his contracting warrant and internal NASA emails. Under federal law, a government representative must have actual authority—either express or implied—to bind the United States to a contract. Here, the contracting officer's warrant authorized him only to procure up to $2.5 million in goods and services, not to enter into leases. An August 2009 email from a NASA program manager requested the delegation of leasing authority to York, but it was not completed. Applicable regulations vested leasing authority in the NASA Administrator and permitted only limited delegation to senior management officials, not to contracting officers. The court found the contracting officer lacked both express and implied actual authority to enter leases on NASA's behalf.

• Implied-in-Fact Contract - Big Easy claimed the parties' conduct from October 2011 onward demonstrated a tacit understanding of a ten-year lease, even though no written long-term agreement was executed. An implied-in-fact contract requires mutual intent inferred from the parties' conduct in light of surrounding circumstances. The undisputed facts showed the parties exchanged draft long-term leases through 2012, continued negotiating terms, and signed an express short-term agreement stating both parties were "interested in executing" a long-term lease. Federal Circuit precedent bars an implied contract covering the same subject matter as an express contract unless entirely unrelated. The court concluded no implied long-term lease existed because the parties intended to reduce any long-term arrangement to writing, and the express short-term agreements precluded an implied contract.

• Quantum Meruit - Big Easy sought to recover over $4 million for improvements to NASA's facility under a quantum meruit theory as an alternative to its contract claims. Quantum meruit is based on a contract implied-in-law, over which the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction. A narrow exception exists for recovering the value of benefits conferred under a contract later rescinded for invalidity. Big Easy did not seek benefits conferred prior to rescission of a contract, but rather sought recovery based on a mistaken understanding that an implied contract existed. Because no contract was ever entered and later rescinded, the court lacked jurisdiction over the quantum meruit claim and granted summary judgment for the government.

• Equitable Estoppel - Big Easy requested equitable estoppel to prevent NASA from denying the existence of a long-term contract based on alleged affirmative misconduct. Equitable estoppel applies when a party attempts to prevent the denial of an existing contract, while promissory estoppel creates a contract that does not exist—a claim over which the court lacks jurisdiction. Because the court had already determined that no implied-in-fact contract existed, Big Easy's claim amounted to promissory estoppel. Even if the court had jurisdiction, Big Easy failed to establish affirmative misconduct because the parties executed express short-term contracts acknowledging no long-term agreement had been reached.

• Express Contract Breach - Big Easy alleged NASA breached the first short-term agreement by failing to execute a long-term lease as contemplated in Article 2, which stated both parties were "interested in executing" a long-term transaction and "intended" it would supersede the short-term agreement. Contractual statements of intent are not binding commitments under Federal Circuit precedent. The plain language reflected the parties' interests but contained no language indicating a present mutual intent regarding specific contractual terms for a long-term transaction.

The plaintiff is represented by William D. Ross, Sr. of Ross Law Firm, PLLC, and Christopher C. Van Cleave of Van Cleave Law, PA. The government is represented by Anna Bondurant Eley, Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Patricia M. McCarthy, and Brett A. Shumate of the Department of Justice.

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