Protest challenging the evaluation of the awardee’s proposal is denied. The protester argued that the awardee lacked the experience and past performance required by the solicitation. But GAO found that the protester’s arguments were premised on definitions that were not contained in the solicitation. The protester contended the agency erred in contacting one of the awardee’s past performance references. The solicitation, however, permitted the agency to obtain past performance information from outside the proposal. The protester alleged the awardee’s price was unrealistically low. GAO found that the agency had reasonably resolved concerns with the awardee’s pricing during discussions.
The General Services Administration issued an RFQ to vendors holding the Federal Supply Schedule contract for travel agent services. The RFQ sought travel services support for the Army. Three vendors, including CW Government Travel, Inc. and BCD Travel USA, LLC, submitted quotations. GSA ultimately selected BCD, finding that CW’s higher past performance rating did not warrant its higher price. CW protested.
CW contended that GSA unreasonably found that BCD’s corporate experience providing travel services for private firms was work of a similar scope and magnitude as that required by the RFQ. CW contended that the RFQ sought experience performing travel services for DOD military and civilian personnel, not private companies. Thus, CW concluded, GSA had either improperly waived the RFQ requirements or failed to assign weaknesses to BCD’s experience.
GAO noted that when a solicitation does not define terms such as scope, magnitude or complexity, agencies are afforded great discretion in determining the relevance of an offeror’s past experience. Here, the RFQ did not define “similar scope and magnitude” nor did it provide specific metrics for assessing a vendor’s experience. Thus, GSA had significant discretion in assessing experience. Moreover, the RFQ did not, as CW contended, require a vendor to demonstrate experience performing travel contracts for DoD. In fact, the RFQ expressly provided that that GSA would evaluate non-DoD experience. GAO did not find the evaluation of BCD’s experience objectionable.
Next, CW argued that GSA misevaluated the resumes for BCD’s proposed key personnel. The RFQ required key personnel to have “U.S. Government travel experience.” CW alleged that U.S. Government travel experience meant experience working on U.S. government travel as a federal employee or as an employee of a federal travel prime or subcontractor.
GAO, however, found that CW’s proffered definition of “U.S. Government travel” was neither found in nor supported by the RFQ. Rather, CW’s definition of this term was identical to a separately defined term: “official travel.” Had GSA sought key personnel with “official travel” experience, it would have used that term in the key personnel section of the RFQ and not the term “U.S. Government travel.” GSA’s evaluation of BCD’s personnel was reasonable and not inconsistent with the RFQ.
CW alleged that GSA improperly assigned BCD a good rating under the past performance factor. CW claimed that none of the BCD’s references were relevant because they involved travel services for private firms, not for DoD personnel. GAO reasoned that once again, CW was effectively arguing that the RFQ restricted relevant past performance to the work performed for DoD customers. But the RFQ did not require DoD-only experience. In any event, in evaluating BCD’s quotation, GSA had noted that the company’s experience was primarily with commercial customers. As a result, GSA had rated BCD’s references slightly lower than CW’s. GAO found that GSA had reasonably distinguished between the vendors’ past performance.
CW complied that GSA had improperly contacted one of BCD’s past performance references to obtain information that had not been included the quotation. CW asserted that this constituted an improper attempt by the agency to repair a deficient proposal.
GAO rejected CW’s argument. The RFQ provided that GSA may consider information from a variety of sources in assessing past performance. Thus, the agency reasonably sought information from one of BCD’s references concerning the dollar value and work performed under the contract.
CW alleged GSA unreasonably evaluated the realism of BCD’s price. For one of its contract line items, BCD had quoted a price of $0. CW argued that the justifications BCD provided for this price could not be reasonably relied upon by the agency.
But GAO reasoned that the pricing team had identified a concern with this item, and the agency had raised the issue during discussions with BCD. GSA explained that it concerns were addressed during discussions based on BCD’s express confirmation that it understood the fixed-price nature of the contract and that the risk of law would be borne solely by the awardee. GAO saw no basis to conclude that the GSA failed to properly evaluate the realism of BCD’s proposed prices.
CW argued that BCD’s proposed price for travel management assist transactions was unrealistically low because it was lower than the government estimate and CW’s proposed price. CW contended that BCD’s price must have been based on unrealistically low compensation rates, which GSA overlooked.
GAO, however, saw no error. The RFQ did not require vendors to provide information about compensation, and the vendors did not provide such information. There was no basis to find that GSA unreasonably failed to consider compensation rates.
CW is represented by Lars E. Anderson, Charlotte R. Rosen, and James P. Miller of Odin Feldman Pittleman PC. The intervenor, BCD, is represented by Timothy A. Furin, Ryan C. Bradel, Alan M. Apple, and Chelsea A. Padgett of Ward & Berry PLLC. The agency is represented by Jeremiah Strack of the General Services Administration. GAO attorney Jonathan L. Kang and John Sorrenti participated the preparation of the decision.
