The U.S. experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the need for sober assessments of what is achievable and what may be beyond the reach of an external intervention. Moreover, those tasked with deriving lessons from such endeavors should be wary of assuming that improvements in technique or tweaks in strategy can compensate for fundamental flaws in a mission’s premise. Without a realistic understanding of, and respect for, the constraints inherent in these situations, attempts to “fix” or refine the approach risk repeating the same mistakes while expecting different outcomes.
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SIGAR’s final report on the broad USG war/reconstruction in Afghanistan
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