Protest challenging the award of a task order for lunar delivery services is denied. The agency reasonably evaluated price realism by using the cost of commercial launch services as a pricing floor. Additionally, the protester’s objections to the agency’s risk ratings amounted to mere disagreement with the agency’s judgment. Finally, the protester’s complaints about disparate treatment were unfounded; the differences in offerors’ ratings stemmed from differences in their approaches.
NASA awarded task orders for delivery services between the Earth and the Moon to three offerors, including Intuitive Machines, LLC (IM). A disappointed offeror, Deep Space Systems, protested the award to IM, challenging NASA’s price realism evaluation and its risk assessments.
DSS contended that NASA’s price realism analysis was flawed because it only compared proposed prices to SpaceX’s lowest available commercial launch price and did not compare each offeror’s pricing to their technical approaches. GAO, however, found that NASA used SpaceX’s commercial pricing to establish a pricing floor. The record also showed that, contrary to DSS’s contentions, NASA cross-checked prices against offerors technical proposals to ensure that they were not so low as to risk unsuccessful performance.
DSS also argued that if NASA had properly evaluated price, it would have found that IM’s price was unrealistically low. But IM’s price was $25 million more than SpaceX’s commercial launch price. NASA appropriately found IM could deliver lunar payloads without unacceptable risk.
Aside from price, DSS alleged that NASA’s risk evaluation under the solicitation’s Likelihood of Successful Payload Delivery factor was flawed. DSS argued, in various ways, that NASA erred in assigning IM a high confidence rating under the Payload Delivery factor’s risk component. First, DSS claimed that IM’s proposed lunar lander, which relied on two tanks for liquid oxygen and methane, was unproven and risky. GAO noted, however, that the IM’s liquid oxygen/methane approach was a mature technology and was suitable for space missions. In fact, NASA considered it one of the most viable propulsion solutions. While NASA had noted that the dual-fuel approach was unproven for a full mission, that risk was accounted for by the assignment of only the second-highest confidence rating to IM.
DSS next argued that IM’s approach was risky because it’s difficult to manage liquid oxygen and methane at low temperatures without risk of evaporation. NASA believed this was overstated. Maintaining oxygen and methane at low temperatures is relatively straightforward and can be managed by simply insulating the liquids. GAO determined that DSS’s complaints about this amounted to little more than disagreement with NASA’s judgment.
DSS also believed IM’s approach was risky because IM was not using enough heritage parts—i.e., parts and material that have a history of being used in space. Again, GAO found this allegation was just disagreement with the agency’s judgment. While NASA acknowledged that fewer heritage components can introduce some risk, that risk did not affect NASA’s confidence in IM’s solution.
In addition to its critiques of IM’s risk rating, DSS objected to its own, moderate confidence, rating. NASA had found that DSS’s thruster approach carried a substantial risk of slosh—that is, movement of propellant in the main tank. DSS argued that it had a device that could mitigate slosh.
GAO was unpersuaded. The solicitation required NASA to consider whether there was a risk with an offeror’s approach, the offeror’s cognizance of the risk, and the steps the offeror took to mitigate the risks. DSS’s proposal gave no indication that it even considered slosh a risk, and the proposal did not identify any measures to mitigate slosh.
DSS further challenged NASA’s evaluation under the Schedule Component factor. It contended that the agency had unreasonably high confidence that IM could deliver a lunar payload by its proposed landing date. GAO found it had no basis to question NASA’s rating of IM’s schedule. IM’s schedule was clear, appropriately sequenced, and well-defined. DSS’s challenges to the schedule were simply derivative of its other arguments on non-heritage parts and fuel management.
DSS further argued that NASA erred in assigning the company a moderate confidence rating on its schedule. Specifically, DSS complained that it had been penalized for not including a preliminary design review milestone. DSS contended that such a review would be performed in house. GAO reasoned that the lack of a preliminary design milestone was a significant issue. What’s more, DSS’s proposal was silent on its purported intent to perform this review in house.
Finally, DSS argued that IM’s high ratings and DSS’s middling ratings were evidence of disparate treatment. GAO rejected this, nothing that IM and DSS proposed different approaches, and their different ratings stemmed from these different approaches.
DSS is represented by Devon E. Hewitt, Scott M. Dinner, and Michael E. Stamp of Protorae Law PLLC. Intervenor IM is represented by Andrew P. Hallowell of Pargament & Hallowell, PLLC. Astrobotic Technology is represented by D. Matthew Jameson III and Marc Felezzola of Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, P.C. The agency is represented by Vincent A. Salgado, Cody Corley, and Brian Wessel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. GAO attorneys Joshua R. Gillerman and Tania Calhoun participated in the preparation of the decision.
