Protest alleging that awardee was ineligible for award is denied. Prior to submitting its proposal, the awardee had converted from a corporation to an LLC. But the awardee submitted its proposal in the name of the corporation and the contract was awarded to the corporation. The protester alleged that the awardee was ineligible because the entity that had bid on and received the award no longer existed. GAO, however, rejected this argument. At the time the awardee submitted its proposal, the government had not yet approved the conversion to an LLC or the name change for the entity. Thus, for federal contracting purposes, the awardee had properly submitted its proposal as a corporation even though it was technically an LLC.
The Army issued a solicitation seeking task order proposals for global intelligence logistics support. DynCorp International, LLC and CACI Technologies, Inc., among others, submitted offers. The Army awarded the task order to CACI. DynCorp’s and CACI’s proposals were both highly rated, but the SSA found that CACI’s proposal was slightly more advantageous under the two most important factors. What’s more, the SSA determined that these advantages justified CACI’s 1.83% price premium. DynCorp protested.
DynCorp first claimed that CACI Technologies, Inc was ineligible for award because the company did not hold the underlying IDIQ contract and no longer existed as a company. DynCorp alleged that the Army itself was uncertain as to which CACI entity was the offering party.
GAO noted that the underlying IDIQ contract had been awarded to CACI Technologies. Inc. in 2014. In 2017, however, CACI Technologies converted to CACI Technologies, LLC. After the name change, CACI worked with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to effect a name change pursuant to the FAR. CACI reached an agreement with DCMA on the name change in 2018, but the agreement was not approved and finalized until April 2020. Thus, when CACI submitted its final proposal revisions in January 2020, DCMA had not yet approved the conversion and the name change.
DynCorp alleged that the CACI was ineligible for award because the CACI Technologies, Inc., which held the IDIQ contract, ceased to exist in 2017 and thus could not submit a proposal or perform a task order under the IDIQ contract. But GAO found that for purposes of submitting a proposal for this procurement, CACI’s use of CACI Technologies, Inc. as the name on its proposal was appropriate because that name matched the name that was still on the IDIQ contract.
Nevertheless, DynCorp complained that CACI was ineligible because the Army could not be certain that the offeror was in fact CACI Technologies, Inc. But the record showed that the Army was not confused about CACI’s identity. The final proposal was submitted by and the award was made to the same entity with the same CAGE Code.
Still, DynCorp contended that CACI did not comply with a solicitation requirement to ensure that its SAM records were active and current at the time of proposal submission. GAO, however, reasoned that when CACI submitted its proposal, the government had not yet finalized the conversion and name change. Thus, for purposes of federal contracts, the government still considered CACI Technologies, Inc. to be the holder of the underlying IDIQ contract. CACI did not update its SAM registration until June 2020, after the government had approved the conversion and name change. Given that the conversion and name change were still pending when CACI submitted its proposal, GAO found that the SAM registration accurately listed CACI Technologies, Inc.
Next, DynCorp argued that the Army unreasonably evaluated its proposal under a program management office plan subfactor. DynCorp claimed that under this subfactor, the Army was required to evaluate offerors common operating picture (COP), a centralized data and information portal that offerors had to provide. DynCorp argued that the Army failed to evaluate its COP.
But GAO found that the Army was not required to evaluate an offeror’s COP. The program management office plan evaluation criterion had two sentences. The first stated that the Army would evaluate the risk of proposed plans. The second sentence stated that the Army would evaluate offerors’ approach to three subtasks identified in the PWS. DynCorp was essentially arguing that the first sentence of the criterion required the agency to evaluate the entirety of proposed plans, including COPs. This interpretation, however, would render the second sentence superfluous. If the first sentence required an evaluation of all the related subtasks in the PWS, there would be no need for the solicitation to also provide that the agency evaluate three specific subtasks. Indeed, the solicitation only identified those three specific subtasks without identify the COP as a specific evaluation criterion.
DynCorp asserted that the Army disparately evaluated offerors because it assessed a strength to CACI’s COP solution while finding that for DynCorp, COP was not an evaluation criterion. GAO rejected this argument, finding that CACI had received a strength because its proposal addressed how the company would manage the existing portal before conversion to the COP. DynCorp’s proposal, on the other hand, only provided information about its COP solutions.
DynCorp further objected to a strength CACI received under the program management office subfactor. The Army assigned a strength to CACI’s approach, finding that it created efficiencies. DynCorp contended that the ability to create efficiencies was not an evaluation factor for the program management office subfactor. GAO found this unconvincing. While efficiencies were not necessarily mentioned in the solicitation, CACI’s ability to create efficiencies that will allow the program management team to focus on more critical tasks was reasonably encompassed within the evaluation.
DynCorp claimed that the Army unreasonably ignored the capabilities of its proposed subcontractors. Contrary to DynCorp’s contentions, the record showed that that the Army considered the capabilities of DynCorp’s subcontractors. While the subcontractors were not evaluated as a stand-alone subfactor, the agency did take note of what DynCorp’s subcontractors brought to the proposal.
Finally, DynCorp argued that the Army unequally evaluated proposals under the solicitation’s transition plan subfactor. The Army assessed three strengths to CACI’s exceptional transition approach, but only one strength to DynCorp’s approach. DynCorp argued that the evaluation was unreasonable because the agency had included statements acknowledging the benefits of DynCorp’s approach but did not assess strengths for those benefits.
GAO opined that the fact that the agency acknowledged the benefits of its approach did not mean that the agency should have assessed strengths for those benefits. In any event, regardless of the strengths assigned but the evaluators , the SSA ultimately decided that CACI and DynCorp’s approach were approximately equal under the transition plan subfactor. The SSA reasonably found that CACI’s proposal had certain unique benefits that made it slightly better than DynCorp’s. GAO found nothing objectionable about this.
DynCorp is represented by Scott F. Lane, Jayna Marie Rust, Katherine S. Nucci, and Edward W. Gray, Jr. of Thompson Coburn LLP. The intervenor, CACI, is represented by Craig S. King, Richard J. Webber, and Travis L. Mullaney of Arent Fox LLP. The agency is represented by Andrew J. Smith, Harry M. Parent, and Stephen Hernandez of the Army. GAO attorneys John Sorrenti and Christina Sklarew participated in the preparation of the decision.
